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 Does Investor Protection Regime Affect the Effectiveness of Outside 
Directorship on the Board?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
           Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to 
globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance.  The purpose of this study is 
to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. 
Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside 
directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international 
context.  We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside 
directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection 
countries.  Our findings mitigate a concern that harmonized corporate governance in low investor 
protection countries may not work.   
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1.        Introduction 
           The United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in order to provide 
effective corporate governance to publicly listed firms.  The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act strengthens the accountability of the board of directors, which leads to higher representation 
of outside directors in the composition of the board (Valenti, 2008).  Following the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many other countries also implemented similar regulations and 
practices of corporate governance to increase the accountability of board members.  For 
example, the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Department of Trade and Industry issued 
the Higgs Review in January 2003, which proposed guidelines on improving board effectiveness, 
and Canadian regulatory bodies instituted federal regulatory reform to improve corporate 
governance such as National Instrument 52-109, equivalent to Sarbanes-Oxley but for the audit 
requirement on internal control systems.  
           The general tendency has been towards globally harmonized regulations and practices of 
board governance.  However, concerns remain.  It is yet unclear that regulation of and practices 
by the board of directors will in fact converge to an appropriate global threshold of effectiveness 
of board governance.  Thus, comparing among countries how well the board of directors 
monitors the management can provide an implication for the costs and benefits of the 
international convergence of both regulations and practices of corporate governance. 
           Outside directorship on the board (i.e., board independence) reflects the extent to which 
the board can maintain its independence in overseeing the financial reporting process.  Prior 
research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005) finds that firms with high board 
independence on the board have lower earnings management than firms with low board 
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independence.  Nevertheless, extant studies on the effectiveness of board governance are limited 
to the context of a single country.  
           Differences in national institutional infrastructures, however, likely influence the 
effectiveness of board governance and generate variation among countries.  La Porta et al. (1999) 
suggest that corporate governance environments are different between countries with strong 
investor protection and countries with weak investor protection.  Thus, differences in laws and 
regulations regarding investor protection may influence the effectiveness of outside directorship 
on the board.  On the one hand, the effectiveness of board governance may be lower in weak 
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection countries.  When investor 
protection is weak, controlling shareholders and managers may wield significant influence over 
the board and thereby impair the effectiveness of board governance.  In addition, outside 
directors may have less incentive to monitor managers in weak investor protection countries 
because of lower reputational losses and risk of lawsuits.  
           On the other hand, weak investor protection is associated with more agency problems, 
which may lead to a higher demand for corporate governance in that country.  Lang et al. (2004) 
and Kwon et al. (2007) suggest that there could be a substitute relationship between investor 
protection and the corporate governance mechanism.  It is also likely that the effectiveness of 
board governance is higher in weak investor protection countries than in strong investor 
protection countries.  
          Moreover, if the complimentary effect of investor protection on corporate governance is 
offset against the substitute effect of investor protection on corporate governance, there will be 
no significant difference in the effectiveness of board governance between strong and weak 
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investor protection countries.  Thus, whether investor protection influences the effectiveness of 
outside directorship on the board becomes an empirical question. 
           While comparing the effectiveness of board governance across countries is warranted, 
research on this issue is highly limited to the data availability.  Lack of international board 
governance data is due to two reasons.  First, there are no electronic databases providing the 
multi-country data on board governance.  Hand data collection is necessary but time consuming.  
Second, even though we hand collect the data, there are few data sources that can provide 
information on board governance of companies from various countries in English.  Thanks to the 
Business Week website, we hand collect the data on board independence from 23 countries.  To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to develop a data set of international board 
independence.  The uniqueness of our data set not only enriches the international corporate 
governance research but also provides some implications to researchers for collecting 
international board governance data.  
           Our study examines both whether earnings management is negatively related to outside 
directorship on the board in the international context and whether investor protection influences 
the relationship between earnings management and outside directorship on the board.  We find 
some evidence that outside directors on the board can effectively constrain earnings management 
across countries.  We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of 
outside directorship on the board in constraining earnings management between strong and weak 
investor protection countries.  Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of board governance 
will not decrease with either international convergence of corporate regulations and practices of 
board governance or the range of strong to weak investor protection regimes.   
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           Our study contributes to the literature in the following two ways.  First, previous studies 
(e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie, et al. 2003; Vafeas, 2005) use the data from a specific national context, 
whereas our study focuses on the international context.  Our findings suggest that the results on 
the outside directorship on the board from a specific context are generalize-able to the 
international context.  Our study contributes to the growth of harmonization of corporate 
regulations and practices on board governance across countries by extending empirical evidence 
in support of global corporate governance regime thus contributing to the public policy debate in 
the post Sarbanes-Oxley period.  
           Second, our study enriches the limited research on the relationship between investor 
protection and corporate governance mechanisms.  Lang et al. (2004) focus on the relationship 
between investor protection and analyst coverage, while Kwon et al. (2007) and Francis and 
Wang (2008) focus on the relationship between investor protection and external auditing.  Unlike 
those studies, we focus on the relationship between investor protection and board governance. 
Our study also adds to a stream of research on the effectiveness of board governance in 
enhancing financial reporting quality.  
           The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We introduce theoretical background and 
develop hypotheses in section 2, discuss research design in section 3, present empirical results in 
section 4, and conclude in section 5. 
   
2.        Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
 
2.1.     The effect of board independence on earnings management 
           The separation of ownership and control creates agency costs arising from adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  Managers may behave for their private purposes at the expense of 
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shareholders’ interests.  One way to solve these agency problems is the oversight of the 
company’s activities by the board of directors. 
           One of the important duties of the board of directors and its committees is to monitor the 
financial reporting process, for example, to review the choice of accounting and disclosure 
policies, oversee the internal control process, and hire external auditors.  As outside directors on 
the board are non-executive directors unaffiliated with the management, they are more likely to 
be independent of the management and thus more effectively monitor the management. 
Moreover, outside directors have incentive to oversee managers because managerial opportunism 
may impair their reputation and increase the risk of lawsuits.  Thus, firms with high board 
independence may engage in less earnings management. 
           U.S. studies on the board of directors verify the positive impact of board independence on 
earnings management.  Klein (2002a) examines whether earnings management is associated with 
board independence and audit committee independence.  She reports that board independence 
and audit committee independence are negatively related to abnormal accruals, suggesting that 
the board and audit committees structured to be more independent of the management are more 
effective in constraining earnings management.  Likewise, Xie et al. (2003) find that lower 
abnormal accruals are associated with greater board independence.  
           Using the likelihood of reporting a marginal earnings increase or avoiding a negative 
earnings surprise to measure earnings management, Vafeas (2005) examine the effect of the 
structures of the board and audit committees on earnings quality.1  He reports that firms with 
high audit committee independence are less likely to report small earnings increase than firms 
with low outside directorship on audit committees.  He also reports that an increase in board 
                                                 
1
            Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use the prospect theory and costs of transactions with stakeholders to explain 
why firms manage earnings to avoid earnings decrease.  
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independence is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of avoiding negative earnings 
surprise.  These results are consistent with the notion that outside directorship is effective in 
reducing the incidence of earnings management.  
           Corresponding to the U.S. studies, there are several studies using data from a single non-
U.S. country to examine the effect of board independence on earnings management.  Firth et al. 
(2007) find that the more independent the board, the more effective is the board in constraining 
earnings management, suggesting that outside directorship might have reduced earnings 
management in China.  Using a sample of Australian firms, Davidson et al. (2005) investigate 
the role of a firm’s internal governance structure in constraining earnings management.  They 
find that both board and audit committee independence are associated with a lower likelihood of 
earnings management. 
           Nevertheless, some non-U.S. studies do not find evidence on the negative association 
between board independence and earnings management.  Chin et al. (2006) examine whether the 
incidence of earnings management around SEOs depends on corporate governance structures, 
and find no evidence that higher board independence leads to lower earnings management in 
Hong Kong.  As opposed to the results in U.S., Bradbury et al. (2006) find an insignificant 
association between earnings management and outside directorship on the board for Singapore 
and Malaysian firms.  
           In summary, although the U.S. studies indicate that board independence plays an effective 
governance role, it is not clear whether this corporate governance mechanism can work 
internationally, especially for countries that have significantly different institutions than U.S.  
This concern is due to the higher ownership concentration in many non-U.S. countries, where the 
main agency problem could be the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
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shareholders as a result of the separation of controlling shareholders’ cash-flow rights (i.e., 
ownership) from their control rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000).  
           The conflict of interest between minority and controlling shareholders may have a dual 
effect on board governance.  On the one hand, board independence is likely to be weakened by 
the entrenchment of controlling shareholders who wield significant influence over the board, 
which increases earnings management.  On the other hand, more agency problems arising from 
the conflict of interest between minority and controlling shareholders provide more opportunities 
to outside directors to play their monitoring role if they really protect the interest of minority 
shareholders.  In this case, board independence may be more effective in constraining earnings 
management.  Based on the U.S. studies, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows:  
H1.  Earnings management is negatively associated with outside directorship on the board in  
        the international context. 
 
2.2.     The effect of investor protection on the effectiveness of board independence 
            La Porta et al. (1998) find that common-law countries have stronger investor protection 
than civil-law countries, suggesting that investor protection varies across countries.  In weak 
investor protection countries, there are few internal and external constrains that might prevent 
and discourage managers and controlling shareholders from opportunistic behavior.  For 
example, it is more difficult to pursue legal actions again managers and controlling shareholders 
for their expropriation of minority shareholders in those countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Thus, it is 
likely that earnings quality is lower in weak investor protection countries than in strong investor 
protection countries.  
           Based on La Porta et al. (1998), researchers compare earnings quality between countries 
with different legal environment and investor protection.  Ball et al. (2000) report that earnings 
8 
 
are more timely and less smoothed in common law countries than in civil law countries, 
suggesting that common law countries have a higher demand for timely public disclosure to 
mitigate information asymmetry and engage in less earnings management than civil law 
countries.  Hung (2001) finds that both countries with accounting systems using accruals more 
extensively and countries with strong investor protection have higher value relevance of 
accounting earnings.  Her findings suggest that strong investor protection may enhance the 
benefits of accrual accounting by constraining opportunism.  
           Leuz et al. (2003) examine earnings management in the international context.  They 
document that the level of earnings management, including the absolute value of accruals and 
income smoothing, is lower in countries with high investor protection than in countries with low 
investor protection, consistent with the notion that investor protection can constrain earnings 
management.  Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine whether legal and political institutions 
affect accounting conservatism across countries, and find that bad news is reflected more timely 
in accounting earnings in strong investor protection countries than in weak investor protection 
countries.  DeFond et al. (2007) document evidence that the annual earnings announcements are 
more informative in countries with strong investor protection.  In summary, prior research 
suggests that higher investor protection is associated with higher quality earnings.  
           The effectiveness of board independence in monitoring the financial reporting process 
may vary with the level of investor protection.  On the one hand, low investor protection 
environments may weaken the monitoring role of outside directors.  In countries with low 
investor protection, companies are less widely held, which facilitates the expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ earnings by controlling shareholders and managers.  These controlling 
shareholders and managers may exert higher influence on the decisions made by the board of 
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directors.  In order to engage in opportunistic activities, they may have more incentive to impair 
the effectiveness of board governance.  Jaggi et al. (2009) find that the monitoring effectiveness 
of independent boards is lower in family-controlled firms.  
           In addition, outside directors in weak investor protection environments are both less 
vulnerable to reputational losses and less likely to experience monetary penalties arising from 
corporate fraud.  Thus, outside directors may be less liable in weak investor protection countries 
than in strong investor protection countries.  
           DeFond and Hung (2004) examine the effect of investor protection on the association 
between CEO turnover and poor performance.  They document that investor protection enhances 
the association between CEO turnover and poor performance.  Since good corporate governance 
will terminate CEOs who perform poorly, the association between CEO turnover and poor 
performance may reflect the quality of corporate governance.  Thus, their findings suggest that 
weak investor protection may be associated with a low quality of corporate governance.  Francis 
and Wang (2008) investigate the effect of investor protection on the audit quality differentiation 
between Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors.  They find that the higher audit quality of Big 4 
auditors relative to non-Big 4 auditors is more pronounced in strong investor protection countries 
than in weak investor protection countries.  Their results indicate a complement relationship 
between investor protection and corporate governance.  
           On the other hand, outside directors may play a more important monitoring role in weak 
investor protection environments.  La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that there might exist more 
agency problems resulting from concentrated ownership structures in weak investor protection 
countries.  If outside directors in those countries are really independent of controlling 
shareholders and managers, they will have more opportunities to solve agency problems than in 
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strong investor protection countries.  Hence, there may be a higher demand for effective board 
governance in weak investor protection countries.  
           Lang et al. (2004) investigate the relationship among ownership structure, analyst 
following, investor protection, and valuation in 27 countries.  They examine whether the 
presence of concentrated family / management control and analyst coverage interactively affects 
firm valuation.  They document a stronger positive interaction effect of the presence of 
concentrated family / management control and analyst coverage on firm valuation in weak 
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection.2  Since analyst coverage is a type 
of corporate governance mechanism, their results suggest that analysts may play a more 
important governance role in weak investor protection than in strong investor protection 
countries.  In a study of international auditor industry specialization, Kwon et al. (2007) find that 
earnings quality is more positively associated with auditor industry specialization in weak 
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection countries.  These studies suggest 
that corporate governance may substitute to investor protection. 
           Taken together, whether board independence is complimentary to or substitutes for 
investor protection could be considered an empirical question.  If the complement (substitute) 
effect of investor protection on outside directorship overwhelmingly dominates over the 
substitute (complement) effect of investor protection on outside directorship, the effectiveness of 
board independence in constraining earnings management will be higher (lower) in strong 
investor protection countries than in weak investor protection countries.  It is also likely that the 
complement effect is offset against the substitute effect and thus the difference in the 
effectiveness of board independence is insignificant between strong and weak investor protection 
                                                 
2
           The positive interaction effect of the presence of concentrated family / management control and analyst 
coverage indicates that the expropriation of minority shareholders may be lower when more analysts follow firms.   
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countries.  Since the directional effect of investor protection on the effectiveness of board 
independence in constraining earnings management is not clear, we develop the second 
hypothesis in the null form:  
H2.  The negative association between earnings management and outside directorship on the  
         board is not affected by investor protection. 
 
3.        Research design 
3.1.     Sample selection 
           We begin to collect the financial data used in our analysis for year 2007 from the 
Compustat Global database.  We choose 2007 as the sample year because the Business Week 
website provided the data of the board of directors only for year 2007 when we collected the data 
for this study.  We select sample firms from all countries included in the Compustat Global 
database except for U.S. as long as the data are available for our analyses.  We exclude U.S. 
firms as our study focuses on the effectiveness of board independence in non-U.S. countries. 
Since U.S. has the uniqueness of legal environment and investor protection, another concern on 
including U.S. firms in the sample is that the results may be driven by the U.S. context.  
           While we collect the financial data from the Compustat Global database, we have to hand 
collect the data on board independence from the Business Week website.  For a country covered 
by the Compustat Global database, in which there are more than 100 firms in 2007, we randomly 
select 100 firms from the database as our sample firms for that country.  We select all firms as 
our sample firms for a country if there are less than 100 firms in that country.  This procedure 
yields a raw sample of 1,427 firms across 24 countries, which have the financial data used in the 
analyses.  Next, we collect the data of directors for raw sample firms from the Business Week 
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website,3 which provides the information about outside and inside directors of companies in 
various countries.  After excluding raw sample firms for which the data on directors are not 
available from the Business Week website, the final sample consists of 629 firms across 23 
countries.  
           Table 1 reports the frequencies and percents of 629 sample firms by country. A large 
proportion of our sample firms are from Singapore (11.76%), Australia (10.81%), and Canada 
(10.49%), while a small proportion of our sample firms are from Denmark (0.64%), Indonesia 
(0.64%), Switzerland (0.95%), and Mexico (0.95%). We note the over representation of 
Singapore, Australia, and Canada in our sample.  We use two ways to control for the effect of 
country dominance.  The first way is to include these three dominance countries’ dummies in the 
model.  The second way is to include all countries’ dummies when we conduct the third 
additional analysis. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
3.2.     Regression models 
           We first estimate the following regression model to test H1: 
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 MB + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 LOSS + b7 XLS +b8 BIG4 
          + b9 OWNC + b10 IFRS +Dominance country dummies + ε                                   (1) 
where EM is earnings management, measured as the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals 
to the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  BDIND is board independence, measured as 
the proportion of outside directors on the board.  INVP is investor protection, measured by legal 
enforcement scores.  Following Leuz et al. (2003), legal enforcement scores are the average of 
three measures from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule 
of law, and (3) level of corruption in a country.  We use legal enforcement as a measure of 
                                                 
3
             http: //investing. businessweek.com/research/common/symbollookup/ symbollookup.asp 
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investor protection because Durnev and Kim (2005) point out that strong investor protection 
laws can be ineffective if they are not enforced.  In the additional analyses, we also use anti-
director rights, legal origin, and institutional clusters as alternative measures of investor 
protection. 
          MB is market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of common equity 
to the book value of common equity.  SIZE is firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets. 
LEV is financial leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. LOSS is loss-
making dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise.  XLS is cross listing, coded 
“1” if a firm is cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange and “0” otherwise.  BIG4 is Big 4 auditor, 
coded “1” if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise.  OWNC is ownership 
concentration, measured by ownership concentration scores from La Porta et al. (1998).  IFRS is 
IFRS adoption, coded “1” if a country has mandatorily adopted IFRS and “0” otherwise.  Since 
firms from Singapore, Australia, and Canada are dominated in our sample, we include the 
dummies of these three countries to control for their over representation.  
           Prior research on earnings management (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003) usually uses 
the Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management.  
Unlike our study, these studies collect the data only from one country.  There are two reasons for 
not choosing discretionary accruals as the main proxy for earnings management in this study.  
First, it is unclear whether the Jones (1991) model performs equally well in measuring 
earnings management among countries.  Second, using discretionary accruals will 
significantly reduce the sample size and thus statistical power for this study.  However, 
we still use discretionary accruals as an alternative measure of earnings management in 
an additional analysis.   
14 
 
           Our proxy for earnings management used in the main tests is measured as the absolute 
value of total accruals deflated by the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  We choose 
this measure as the main proxy for earnings management for two reasons.  First, extant 
international studies on earnings management (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Sun, 2009) employ this 
measure.  These studies also select the data from various countries.  Second, using this measure 
can avoid the significant reduction in sample size, which is crucially important for international 
studies with data constraints.  Like Leuz et al. (2003), we also use income smoothing as an 
alternative measure of earnings management in an additional analysis.   
           If outside directors are more effective in constraining earnings management than inside 
directors in the international context, we expect that the coefficient on board independence (b1) 
will be negative and significant.  We include INVP in model (1) because Leuz et al. (2003) find 
that earnings management is lower in countries with strong investor protection than in countries 
with weak investor protection.  MB is added in model (1) as Klein (2002b) find that the market-
to-book ratio is positively associated with earnings management.  Armstrong et al. (2010) assert 
that large firms provide high quality information, suggesting that large firms may have less 
earnings management.  However, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that large firms have high 
political costs, which may lead to more earnings management.  Thus, we include SIZE in model 
(1) although the effect of firm size on earnings management could be negative or positive.  Klein 
(2002a) also finds that financial leverage is positively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.  Francis et al. (2004) find that accrual quality is lower for firms that 
incurred losses, suggesting that earnings management is positively associated with loss-making.  
           We include XLS in the model because firms cross-listed on the U. S. stock exchanges may 
have higher accounting quality.  Since Big 4 auditors provide high quality audit, earnings 
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management may be lower for firms audited by Big 4 auditors than for firms audited by non-Big 
4 auditors (Becker et al., 1998).  Prior research (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) indicates that concentrated ownership may have both positive and negative impact 
on corporate governance.  Barth et al. (2008) find that firms applying IFRS have less earnings 
management.  Thus, we also include BIG4, OWNC, and IFRS in the model. Based on the above 
discussion, we expect that b2, b7, b8 and b10 will be negative and that b3, b5, and b6 will be 
positive.  However, b4 and b9 are expected to be either positive or negative.4, 5 
            We estimate the following regression model to test H2: 
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 BDIND*INVP +b4 MB + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 LOSS 
         + b8 XLS +b9 BIG4 + b10 OWNC + b11 IFRS+ Dominance country dummies + ε        (2) 
We include the interaction term of BDIND and INVP in model (2).  If investor protection affects 
the effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management, then the 
coefficient on BDIND*INVP (b3) will be significant. 
 
4.        Empirical results 
           We report the descriptive statistics in Panel A, Table 2.  The mean and median of the 
absolute value of accruals deflated by the absolute value of cash flow from operations (EM) are 
1.06 and 0.48, respectively.  The mean and median of board independence (BDIND) are 0.70 and 
0.75, respectively.  Thus, on average, about 70% to 75% of directors on the board are outside 
directors for our sample firms.  
           Panel B, Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations among the independent variables.  We 
find that board independence is not significantly correlated with investor protection, suggesting 
that there is no significant difference in the demand for outside directorship across countries.  
                                                 
4
            INVP is standardized as (INVP –Mean)/Std. 
5
            All continuous variables in models (1) and (2) are winsorized at the level of 1% and 99%. 
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Not significant correlation between board independence and investor protection also indicates 
the internationalization of corporate governance regulations and practices, namely, similar board 
structure.  The highest correlation coefficient is 0.61 for XLS and BIG4, which indicates that 
cross-listed firms in U.S. are more likely to be clients of Big 4 auditors.  Since all other absolute 
values of correlation coefficients are less than 0.61, multicollinearity is less likely to be a 
substantive issue in this study.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
           Table 3 reports the results on testing H1.  We find that the coefficient on BDIND is 
negative and significant (t = -2.40, p < .01), which supports H1.  This suggests that international 
outside directorship is effective in constraining earnings management in the international 
context.  Our results are consistent with those documented in a specific context (the U.S. context 
in most studies).  Like Leuz et al. (2003), we document a negative and significant coefficient on 
INVP (t = -2.10, p < .05), consistent with the notion that earnings management is lower in 
countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection.  We 
also find that loss-making firms have larger absolute value of accruals.  Clients of Big 4 auditors 
and firms from countries with high ownership concentration have lower absolute value of 
accruals. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
           Table 4 provides the results on testing H2.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
of BDIND and INVP is insignificant, suggesting that investor protection does not affect the 
effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management.  Thus, outside 
directors may play a similar monitoring role in the financial reporting process across countries.  
  Insert Table 4 about here 
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           We also conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our results.  First, we 
use income smoothing as an alternative measure of earnings management.  Leuz et al. (2003) 
argue that managers may use accounting discretion to conceal poor current performance. 
Moreover, managers may also use real business activities to smooth earnings.6   Like Leuz et al. 
(2003), we measure income smoothing by the correlation coefficient between changes in total 
accruals and changes in cash flows from operations over the period from year t-4 to year t.  This 
income smoothing measure reflects both accrual and real earnings management.  Since a large 
negative correlation coefficient between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows from 
operations indicates a strong income smoothing, we multiply the correlation coefficient by -1 to 
measure earnings management.   
           Table 5 reports the results when we test the hypotheses using income smoothing as a 
measure of earnings management.  Columns 3 and 4, Table 5 show the results on testing H1.  We 
still find that income smoothing is negatively associated with board independence (t = -1.44, p < 
.10), consistent with H1.  We also find that income smoothing is negatively associated with 
investor protection (t = -1.66, p < .05), consistent with Leuz et al. (2003).  In addition, we find 
that income smoothing is lower for firms cross-listed in U.S., firms incurring losses, clients of 
Big 4 auditors, firms from countries with high ownership concentration or countries that have 
mandatorily adopted IFRS, while income smoothing is higher for large or high growth firms.  
Columns 5 and 6, Table 5 include the results on testing H2.  We find that the coefficient on 
BDIND*INVP is insignificant.  Thus, investor protection does not affect the effectiveness of 
outside directors on the board in constraining income smoothing.  This suggests that outside 
directors may play an equally important role in overseeing financial reporting process wherever 
they sit on the board in strong or weak investor protection countries.  
                                                 
6
           For example, Bartov (1993) finds that managers use asset sales to manipulate earnings.  
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  Insert Table 5 about here 
           Second, we examine whether the results on testing H2 are sensitive to using alternative 
measures of investor protection.  We choose anti-director rights, legal origin, and institutional 
clusters as alternative measures of investor protection.  Anti-director rights indicate the voting 
rights of minority shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003).  Since La Porta et al. (1998) find that investor 
protection is higher in common law countries than in civil law countries, legal origin, which is a 
dummy coded “1” for a common law country and “0” for a civil law country, is a proxy for 
investor protection.  Like Leuz et al. (2003), we classify countries into three institutional clusters. 
The third alternative measure of investor protection is a dummy coded “2”, “1”, and “0” for a 
country in clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively.7  The non-tabulated results also show that the 
negative association between earnings management and board independence is not affected by 
using anti-director rights, legal origin, or institutional clusters. Thus, our results are robust to 
these alternative measures of investor protection.  
           Third, we test the hypotheses by controlling for the fixed country and industry effects.  
We included country dummies and industry dummies in models (1) and (2).  When we estimate 
model (1), we find that the coefficient on BDIND is negative and significant (non-tabulated t = -
2.24, p < .05).  We also find that the coefficient on BDIND*INVP is insignificant when model 
(2) is estimated.  Hence, the results still hold after controlling for the fixed country and industry 
effects. 
           Fourth, we examine whether there is any endogeneity problem for using board 
independence in our OLS regressions.  We use the Hausman endogeneity test as follows. First, 
we choose a dummy variable (i.e., ESOX) coded “1” for countries with a mandatory corporate 
                                                 
7
           The three institutional clusters are based on the nine institutional variables from La Prota et al. (1997; 1998) 
including stock market capitalization, listed firms, IPOs, ownership concentration, anti-director rights, disclosure 
index, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index.  
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governance code equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and “0” otherwise as an instrumental 
variable of board independence.  ESOX can be used as the instrumental variable because these 
mandatory corporate governance codes can affect board independence but cannot be affected by 
earnings management.  Second, we run the first-stage regression as follows: 
    BDIND = a0 + a1 ESOX + a2 MB + a3 SIZE + a4 LEV + a5 LOSS +ε                    (3)                                          
          We include MB in model (3) because Bathala and Rao (1995) and Linck et al. (2008) find 
that board independence is negatively associated with growth opportunities.  Since Lehn et al. 
(2003) and Boone et al. (2007) document that board independence is higher for large firms, SIZE 
is included in model (3).  We add LEV in the model as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
financial leverage could be a substitute to corporate governance.  We also include LOSS in the 
model because Klein (2002b) suggests that firms incurring losses might have a lower demand for 
corporate governance.   
       We find that the coefficient on ESOX is positive and significant (non-tabulated t = 5.96, p 
< .01), suggesting that more outside directors sit on the board when countries have mandatory 
corporate governance codes equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Third, we include the 
residual value from model (3) (i.e., RBDIND) as an additional regressor in model (1).  We then 
estimate model (1) and find that the coefficient on RBDIND is insignificant, which indicates that 
there is no severe endogeneity problem when we use board independence in our OLS 
regressions.  
       Fifth, we examine whether board independence has different effectiveness in constraining 
earnings management between countries with mandatory corporate governance codes equivalent 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and countries without such codes.  We re-estimate model (2) by 
replacing INVP with ESOX.  We still find that the coefficient on BDIND*ESOX is insignificant.  
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Thus, outside directorship is equally effective in constraining earnings management regardless of 
whether countries have mandatory corporate governance codes or not.  
           Sixth, we estimate models (1) and (2) using signed value of accruals.  Table 6 includes the 
results on directional tests on accruals.  We find that the coefficient on BDIND is negative but 
insignificant in model (1). We also find that the coefficient on BDIND*INVP is negative and 
significant, suggesting that outside directorship may more effectively constrain earnings 
management in high investor protection countries than in low investor protection countries. 
However, we recommend that these results should be cautiously explained as F-statistic and 
adjusted R2 indicate that using signed accruals as the dependent variable in models (1) and (2) 
seems statistically problematical. 
  Insert Table 6 about here 
           Seventh, we use discretionary accruals as the dependent variable in models (1) and (2).  
We compute discretionary accruals for any industry-country using the Jones (1991) model.  After 
the exclusion of observations omitting discretionary accruals, the sample size dramatically 
decreases from 629 to 381 observations.  We find insignificant coefficients on board 
independence in model (1) and the interaction of board independence and investor protection in 
model (2).  We also find an insignificant coefficient on investor protection in model (1), 
inconsistent with the theory (Leuz et al., 2003).  A concern on using discretionary accruals in this 
study is that the statistical power of testing the hypotheses is low when the sample size is 
dramatically reduced.  Thus, the results on discretionary accruals in this study should be 
cautiously interpreted.  
           Eighth, we examine the relationship between board independence and auditor choice.  
Beasley and Petroni (2001) document a positive association between board independence and 
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audit quality.  As Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audit than non-Big 4 auditors (Francis et 
al.. 1999), we run the logistic regression by using BIG4 as the dependent variable in the models.  
We find a positive and significant coefficient on BDIND in model (1) (non-tabulated χ2 = 1.78, p 
< .10), suggesting that outside directors also demand high quality auditors in the international 
context.  We also find an insignificant coefficient on BDIND*INVP in model (2).  Thus, the 
results on auditor choice are consistent with the results on earnings management.  
           Ninth, we examine the relationship between board independence and dividend payouts.  
La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that high corporate governance leads to high dividend payouts.  
We re-run the logistic regression by replacing the dependent variable in the models with a 
dummy variable coded “1” if a firm pays dividends and “0” otherwise.  We find that the 
coefficient on BDIND in model (1) is positive and significant (non-tabulated χ2 = 1.79, p < .10), 
which indicates that firms with high board independence are more likely to pay dividends than 
firms with low board independence.  Like the results on earnings management, we still find that 
the coefficient on BDIND*INVP in model (2) is insignificant.   
 
5.       Conclusion 
           This study examines whether earnings management is negatively associated with board 
independence and whether investor protection affects the association between earnings 
management and board independence.  We document some international evidence that outside 
directors effectively constrain earnings management.  We also find that investor protection does 
not affect the effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management.  The 
results suggest that outside directors may play a similar role in monitoring the financial reporting 
process wherever they sit on the board in strong or weak investor protection countries.  Thus, our 
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findings support the internationalization of regulations and practices on board governance as 
evinced by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
           This study provides several implications for future research.  First, it is warranted for 
future research to improve data availability.  Our study has limitations on data collection. Due to 
the data constraints, we collect the data only for 2007.  We acknowledge that our results might 
be affected by the financial crisis that started in 2007.  Future research may expand the sample 
by collecting more recent data from alternative data sources.  Second, it is worth investigating 
the relationship between investor protection and the monitoring effectiveness of a particular kind 
of corporate governance mechanisms.  Our study indicates that the monitoring effectiveness of 
board independence is equal across countries, whereas Lang et al. (2004) and Kwon et al. (2007) 
suggest that the monitoring effectiveness of analyst coverage and auditor industry specialization 
is higher in low investor protection countries than in high investor protection countries.  Thus, 
the results on one kind of corporate governance mechanisms may not apply to another kind of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Third, this study begs a question of why the results on board 
independent are inconsistent with those on other corporate governance mechanisms.  Future 
research might explain why investor protection differently affects the monitoring effectiveness of 
various corporate governance mechanisms.  
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Table 1 
Breakdown of sample firms and investor protection scores 
 
Panel A. Breakdown of sample firms by country 
      
 
Country Name Country Code Frequency             Percent (%) 
Australia AUS 68 10.81 
Brazil BRA 9 1.43 
Canada CAN 66 10.49 
Switzerland CHE 6 0.95 
Germany DEU 25 3.97 
Denmark DNK 4 0.64 
France FRA 24 3.82 
United Kingdom GBR 54 8.59 
Greece GRC 11 1.75 
Hong Kong HKG 35 5.56 
Indonesia IDN 4 0.64 
Japan JPN 42 6.68 
Korea KOR 14 2.23 
Mexico MEX 6 0.95 
Malaysia MYS 54 8.59 
Netherlands NLD 9 1.43 
New Zealand NZL 14 2.23 
Philippines PHL 17 2.70 
Singapore SGP 74 11.76 
Sweden SWE 31 4.93 
Thailand THA 27 4.29 
Taiwan TWN 11 1.75 
South Africa ZAF 24 3.82 
Total   629 100.00 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Panel B. Investor protection scores 
         
Country Name INVP Anti-director right Legal origin             Institutional clusters 
Australia 9.51 4 1 3 
Brazil 6.13 3 0 - 
Canada 9.75 5 1 3 
Switzerland 10.00 2 0 2 
Germany 9.05 1 0 2 
Denmark 10.00 2 0 2 
France 8.68 3 0 2 
United Kingdom 9.22 5 1 3 
Greece 6.82 2 0 1 
Hong Kong 8.91 5 1 3 
Indonesia 2.88 2 0 1 
Japan 9.17 4 0 2 
Korea 5.55 2 0 1 
Mexico 5.37 1 0 - 
Malaysia 7.72 4 1 3 
Netherlands 10.00 2 0 2 
New Zealand 10.00 4 1 - 
Philippines 3.47 3 0 1 
Singapore 8.93 4 1 3 
Sweden 10.00 3 0 2 
Thailand 4.89 2 1 1 
Taiwan 7.37 3 0 2 
South Africa 6.45 5 1 2 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations 
       
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
  
Variable  N Mean Median  Std Q1  Q3 
EM 629 1.06 0.48 2.21 0.21 0.91 
BDIND 629 0.70 0.75 0.18 0.57 0.86 
INVP 629 8.45 9.05 1.65 7.72 9.51 
MB 629 2.34 1.81 2.08 1.03 3.02 
SIZE 629 6.82 6.70 2.06 5.40 8.27 
LEV 629 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.21 
LOSS 629 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 
XLS 629 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
BIG4 629 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
OWNC 629 0.37 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.52 
IFRS 629 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
       
Panel B. Pearson correlations 
Variable  INVP   MB SIZE   LEV LOSS  XLS BIG4 OWNC IFRS 
BDIND 0.06 0.10***  0.24*** 0.18*** -0.03 0.27*** 0.15***  -0.01 0.01 
INVP  0.09*  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.22*** 0.23*** -0.43***  0.30*** 
MB   0.09*  0.09† -0.07† 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.19*** 
SIZE    0.28***      -0.27***  0.33*** 0.08† -0.20*** 0.15*** 
LEV     -0.03 0.09* 0.05 -0.09* 0.07† 
LOSS      0.07† 0.09*   0.05 -0.06 
XLS       0.61*** -0.19*** -0.09* 
BIG4        -0.28*** -0.33*** 
OWNC                  -0.17*** 
          
EM : earnings management, measured as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash 
flow from operations, 
BDIND: board independence, measured as the proportion of outside directors on the board, 
MB: market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of common equity to the book value of 
common equity, 
SIZE: firm size, measured as the logarithm value of total assets,  
LEV: financial leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
LOSS: loss-making dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise, 
XLS: cross listing, coded “1” if a firm is cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange and “0” otherwise, 
INVP: investor protection, measured by legal enforcement scores, i.e., the average of three measures  
from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule of law, and (3) level of corruption in 
a country (Leuz et al., 2003).  
BIG4: Big 4 auditor, coded “1” if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise. 
OWNC: ownership concentration, measured by ownership concentration scores from La Porta et al. (1998). 
IFRS: IFRS adoption, coded “1” if a country has mandatorily adopted IFRS and “0” otherwise. 
       † p < .10 (two-tailed). 
    * p <  .05 (two-tailed). 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed).  
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Table 3 
Results on testing H1 
        
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 2.54 4.90*** 
BDIND - -1.23 -2.40** 
INVP - -0.24 -2.10* 
MB + 0.02                         0.59 
SIZE ? -0.05                        -0.87 
LEV + 0.59                         0.84 
LOSS + 1.62 5.78*** 
XLS - -0.26                        -0.81 
BIG4 - -1.37                         -2.35*** 
OWNC ? -1.18 -1.76* 
IFRS - -0.27                        -1.12 
    
N                            629 
F-statistic   5.69*** 
Adj. R2                                 8.85% 
    
INVP is standardized as: (INVP-Mean) / Std = (INVP – 8.45) / 1.65. 
The regression model is as follows: 
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 MB + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 LOSS + b7 XLS +b8 BIG4 + b9 OWNC  
          + b10 IFRS + Dominance country dummies  + ε                                                   (1) 
        * p <  .05 (one-tailed).                                                
  ** p <  .01 (one-tailed). 
*** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Results on testing H2 
        
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 2.53 4.88*** 
BDIND ? -1.24 -2.41** 
INVP ? -0.16 -0.42 
BDIND*INVP ? -0.11 -0.22 
MB + 0.03 0.61 
SIZE ? -0.04 -0.84 
LEV + 0.58 0.83 
LOSS + 1.62 5.78*** 
XLS - -0.26 -0.81 
BIG4 - -1.37 -2.34** 
OWNC ? -1.17 -1.75* 
IFRS - -0.27 -1.12 
    
N   629 
F-statistic   5.28*** 
Adj. R2     8.71% 
    
INVP is standardized as:  (INVP-Mean) / Std = (INVP – 8.45) / 1.65. 
The regression model is as follows: 
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + + b3 BDIND*INVP +b4 MB + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 LOSS + b8 XLS  
         +b9 BIG4 + b10 OWNC + b11 IFRS + Dominance country dummies + ε                                    (2) 
        * p <  .05 (one-tailed).                                                
  ** p <  .01 (one-tailed). 
*** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
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Table 5 
 Results on income smoothing 
    
  
    
                       H1           H2 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.77  8.06***  0.77    8.03*** 
BDIND  - -0.14   -1.44† -0.14 -1.46† 
INVP - -0.04   -1.66* -0.01    -0.13 
BDIND*INVP    -0.04    -0.40 
MB +            0.01 1.55† 0.01     1.58† 
SIZE ? 0.02     2.54** 0.02 2.56** 
LEV + 0.13     0.99 0.13     0.98 
LOSS + -0.11 -2.06* -0.10    -2.03* 
XLS - -0.13  -2.19* -0.13    -2.19* 
BIG4 - -0.25  -1.78* -0.25    -1.77* 
OWNC ? -0.19   -1.51† -0.19    -1.49† 
IFRS - -0.06 -1.33† -0.06    -1.33† 
      
N        613       613 
F-statistic    3.46*** 3.22*** 
Adj. R2       4.97%  4.84% 
  
  
  
        † p < .10 (one-tailed). 
    * p <  .05 (one-tailed). 
  ** p <  .01 (one-tailed). 
*** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 6 
Results on signed accruals 
    
  
    
                       H1           H2 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 1.57 4.02***  1.52  3.94*** 
BDIND  - -0.44   -1.15 -0.44      -1.15 
INVP - -0.08 -0.88 0.35       1.24 
BDIND*INVP      -0.64      -1.68* 
MB +         -0.03   -1.06 -0.03 -1.01 
SIZE ? -0.00   -0.01 -0.00 0.05 
LEV + 0.27  0.51 0.26  0.49 
LOSS + -0.07   -0.33 -0.06      -0.29 
XLS - -0.18   -0.75 -0.13 -0.56 
BIG4 - -0.64   -1.15 -0.28  -0.93 
OWNC ? -0.54     -1.07 -0.69      -1.49† 
IFRS - -0.21   -1.15 -0.14 -0.90 
      
N         629     629 
F-statistic    1.16 1.51† 
Adj. R2       0.33%     0.89% 
  
  
  
           † p < .10 (one-tailed). 
      * p <  .05 (one-tailed). 
  *** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
